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 COSTS OF BLOCKING INJUNCTIONS 
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 It is trite to state that the infringement of intellectual property rights over 
the internet poses substantial problems to rightholders.1 More interesting are the 
methods employed by rightholders to combat these problems. Bringing claims 
against individual infringers is possible,2 assuming they can be identified and 
are within the court’s jurisdiction, but present obvious difficulties: it may be 
excessively cumbersome to sue a huge number of individuals who may not even 
be in a position to provide satisfactory redress. It is therefore understandable 
why rightholders have found it more efficient and effective to bring claims 
against third parties who are implicated in wrongdoing. Claimants have found 
some success in bringing claims against “bad-acting” websites – such as, 
perhaps most notoriously, The Pirate Bay websites – which participate in the 
tortious infringement of the claimant’s rights.3 Such websites may be considered 
to be accessories, and to commit wrongs themselves.4 But claims against third-
party websites do not necessarily provide adequate remedies, so rightholders 
have recently sought to stem infringement by going after internet service 
providers (ISPs) as a more effective content access “choke point”.5 ISPs are a 
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1 In Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 at 
[12] Kitchin LJ said: “There can be no doubt that a good deal of the business of counterfeiters is conducted 
using the internet. In 2008 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development published a report 
entitled The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy in which it observed that the online environment 
attracted counterfeiters for various reasons including anonymity, flexibility, the size of the market and the ease 
with which customers can be deceived. The European Commission also observed in its 2014 report [Report on 
EU Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Results at the EU Border] that the top six categories 
of goods seized were all goods of a kind which are often shipped by post or courier after an order placed via the 
internet.” 
2 See eg R Piasentin, “Unlawful? Innovative? Unstoppable? A comparative analysis of the potential legal 
liability facing P2P end-users in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada” (2006) 14 Intentional Journal 
of Law & Information Technology 195 
3 See eg Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR 
14.  
4 For further consideration of such claims in this journal see P Davies, ‘Accessory Liability: Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights’ [2011] IPQ 390. See too P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, 2015). It 
should be noted that the CJEU has, somewhat controversially, recently held that The Pirate Bay can even be 
primarily liable for its own acts of communication to the public with full knowledge of the infringement of 
copyright: Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV (Case C-610/15). 
5 For a comparative overview, see G Dinwoodie, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Secondary Liability of Online 
Service Providers’ in G Dinwoodie (ed), Secondary Liability of Internet Service Providers (Springer, 2017). See 
too L Edwards, Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights 
(WIPO Report, 2010); Nina Elkin-Koren ‘After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online 
step further removed from the “direct” infringement of the individual 
wrongdoer than any particular websites, but an injunction which compels the 
ISP to block users from accessing certain websites may be the most effective 
form of relief for a rightholder. However, blocking orders raise a number of 
important questions. Is a court able to grant such an injunction? Assuming the 
court does have jurisdiction to make a blocking order, should an injunction be 
granted? Who should bear the costs of the injunction? 
 This article will consider these three key questions in turn. Most of the 
blocking orders granted in England and Wales have been made in the context of 
copyright infringement,6 but it is suggested that little should turn upon the 
precise nature of the intellectual property right protected; the focus of this 
article will be upon trade mark infringement. This is because the first blocking 
orders in this area have been recently made following the decisions of Arnold J 
in Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd,7 which were upheld 
by the Court of Appeal.8 In Cartier, the claimants were members of the 
Richemont group, which produce and sell luxury goods under very well-known 
trade marks such as Cartier, Montblanc and IWC. The claimants successfully 
sought injunctions against the five main British ISPs9 to compel them to block 
target websites selling (virtually exclusively) counterfeit pens, jewellery, and 
watches. Cartier is something of a “test case” which “is likely to be followed by 
other applications by Richemont and other trade mark owners, both here and in 
other countries”.10  
                                           
Intermediaries’ in S Frankel & D Gervais (eds), The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age 
(CUP, 2014) 
6 See eg the decisions of Arnold J in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications plc [2011] 
EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2012] Bus LR 1471; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications plc 
(No 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), [2012] Bus LR 1525; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR 14; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd (No 2) [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR 15; EMI Records Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [2013] ECDR 8; Football Association Premier League Ltd v British 
Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), [2013] ECDR 14; Paramount Home Entertainment 
International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), [2014] ECDR 7. See too Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 937 (Ch) (Henderson J). 
7 See [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [2015] 1 All E.R. 949; [2014] EWHC 3915 (Ch); [2015] 1 All E.R. 1027 and 
[2014] EWHC 3765 (Ch); [2015] 1 All E.R. 1023. 
8 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700. 
9 Sky, BT, EE, TalkTalk and Virgin, which have a market share of some 95% of UK broadband users: [2014] 
EWHC 3354 (Ch), [2015] 1 All E.R. 949 [1] (Arnold J). 
10 [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [6] (Arnold J). Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has already discussed the 
litigation in Cartier: Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc. 2017 SCC 34. For further discussion of treatment of 
Cartier in foreign courts, see eg J Riordan, ‘Website Blocking Injunctions under United Kingdom and European 
Law’ in G Dinwoodie (ed), Secondary Liability of Internet Service Providers (Springer, 2017) 20-21. 
The Supreme Court has refused permission to appeal on the question of 
whether the blocking injunctions were correctly granted. This sensibly 
recognises that blocking injunctions are an important and useful tool for 
rightholders seeking to protect their rights.11 However, the Supreme Court has 
granted permission to appeal on the issue of costs. A majority of the Court of 
Appeal (Kitchin and Jackson LJJ) agreed with Arnold J that the ISPs should 
bear both the costs of the application and the costs of implementing the 
blocking order. Briggs LJ dissented, on the basis that the rightholders should 
have to bear the costs of implementation. It is suggested that the judgment of 
Briggs LJ is more consistent with general equitable principles underpinning 
injunctive relief if the ISPs are not considered to be wrongdoers. On the other 
hand, if the ISPs are considered to be wrongdoers, probably as accessories 
(which the Court of Appeal did not contemplate) then the majority decision 
seems entirely orthodox.  
 
The jurisdiction to grant blocking injunctions 
 The ability of courts in England and Wales to grant a blocking injunction 
is made explicitly clear in the context of copyright infringement. This is as a 
result of section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,12 which 
gives effect to Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive.13 That 
provision requires that rightholders must be able to apply for an injunction 
“against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright or related right”.14 Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive15 imposes 
a similar requirement as regards IP rights more generally, which includes trade 
mark infringement, but there has been no legislative implementation of the 
provision in the United Kingdom.16 It is therefore especially important in this 
context to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to grant a blocking order. 
                                           
11 Their availability is also required under EU law: see Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive and 
Article 11 of the Enforcement, considered immediately below. 
12 This was inserted into the Act via the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2498. 
13 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, transposed into domestic law by the 
Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2498. 
14 See too recital (59). 
15 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, transposed largely into domestic law by the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc) 
Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1028. 
16 The Government thought that this was not necessary: see Patent Office, “Consultation Paper: The UK 
Implementation of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights” (August 2005), Annex B, 
transposition note for art.11. 
 Section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is framed in strikingly broad 
terms: 
“The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an 
injunction … in all cases in which it appears to be just and convenient to 
do so.” 
However, it has become settled practice that although the courts have the 
jurisdiction to grant injunctions in a very wide range of circumstances, the court 
will refuse to grant an injunction unless certain criteria are met. It would appear 
that granting an injunction in Cartier does represent an extension of the court’s 
practice in granting injunctions, but that this has happened in an incremental 
manner which should not cause alarm. 
 
Injunctions against wrongdoers 
 If the ISPs are considered to be wrongdoers, then the explanation for 
injunctive relief is straightforward. Injunctions are often granted to prevent 
wrongful conduct. However, it is not easy to explain injunctive relief in this 
manner – either on the basis of primary, free-standing liability or accessory 
liability. ISPs are generally considered to be ‘innocent’ intermediaries, as 
opposed to ‘bad-acting’ intermediaries. Intermediaries in the latter category may 
well be considered to be wrongdoers;17 the focus here is on intermediaries in the 
former category.18 
It is, rightly, difficult to establish that the intermediary should be 
“primarily” liable to the rightholder, when the intermediary does not itself 
infringe the rightholder’s intellectual property rights. That infringement is 
carried out by another individual who commits the primary tort. Moreover, 
English courts have long been reluctant to impose upon intermediaries any form 
of primary liability through a duty of care imposed by the law of negligence.19 
This is sensible: an intermediary should not be liable for mere negligence when 
                                           
17 See further See R Arnold and P Davies, ‘Accessory Liability for Intellectual Property Infringement: The Case 
of Authorisation’ (2017) 133 LQR 442. See too Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV (Case C-610/15). 
18 For further comparative discussion see eg C Angelopoulos ‘Beyond Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive 
Intermediary Liability for Copyright Infringement in Europe’ [2013] IPQ 253 and European Intermediary 
Liability in Copyright (Kluwer Law International, Information Law Series, 2016). 
19 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad plc [1988] 1 AC 1013 (Lord Templeman); Cartier [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 
All ER 700 [54]. It is unclear what effect the recent decision of the CJEU in Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV (Case 
C-610/15) will have on domestic law; that case may perhaps be restricted to the particularly egregious nature of 
The Pirate Bay websites. 
it has not directly infringed the claimant’s rights. There is no reason for 
negligence to engulf this entire area of law.20 
Accessory liability is potentially a more promising route to viewing 
intermediaries, including ISPs, as wrongdoers. The principles of accessory 
liability in intellectual property law have not yet been the subject of 
harmonisation at a European level. As a matter of domestic law, it is important 
to bear in mind that accessory liability in the context of copyright or trade mark 
disputes rests upon the same principles as tort law more generally. As Lord 
Sumption put it in Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK, cases on intellectual 
property in this area “depend on ordinary principles of the law of tort”.21 
Unfortunately, the law on accessory liability in tort law is somewhat murky;22 
there are strong arguments in favour of finding a party liable as an accessory if 
he or she assists a primary tort,23 and this may encompass ISPs who assist or 
facilitate trademark infringement. However, the Supreme Court in Fish & Fish 
Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK thought that assistance alone was insufficient, and 
accessory liability should only arise if a person induces or authorises a primary 
tort, or participates in a common design with the primary tortfeasor.24 It is 
unclear whether an ISP will satisfy these requirements for accessory liability. It 
will generally be difficult to establish authorisation of any particular 
infringement,25 and a passive intermediary will not have induced or procured 
any wrong. It may, however, sometimes be possible to argue that an 
intermediary could be liable for participating in a common design. By hosting 
infringing websites, for example, the intermediary could be considered to be 
participating in wrongful conduct in a more than minimal way, and once the 
intermediary actually knows26 of the primary tort then a common design may be 
found. It is arguable that once the rightholder informs the intermediary of the 
primary tort, then the intermediary has sufficient knowledge to be liable as an 
                                           
20 Cf T Weir, ‘The Staggering March of Negligence’, in P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: 
Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998).  
21 [2015] UKSC 10; [2015] A.C. 1229 [40]. A difficulty arises concerning confidence, which straddles both 
common law and equity, and some cases analyse accessory liability under the banner of dishonest assistance, 
see eg Thomas v Pearce [2000] FSR 718. This raises a difficult question of taxonomy, although ultimately it is 
suggested that similar principles of accessory liability should apply across the common law/equity divide: P 
Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, 2015) 100-102. 
22 See generally P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, 2015) ch 6. 
23 P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, 2015) 195-202, 213-220. For discussion in the context of breach of 
confidence, see R Arnold, ‘Accessory Liability for Breach of Confidence’ (2014) 36 EIPR 554. 
24 [2015] UKSC 10; [2015] A.C. 1229 [39]. 
25 See R Arnold and P Davies, ‘Accessory Liability for Intellectual Property Infringement: The Case of 
Authorisation’ (2017) 133 LQR 442. 
26 With the requisite degree of specificity: see further P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, 2015) 206-209. 
accessory on the basis of a common design.27 If so, then injunctive relief should 
clearly be available to prevent future wrongdoing.  
This analysis could cause great concern to intermediaries. Two major 
factors may assuage their fears. First, they are unlikely to have to pay damages 
as a result of the “safe harbour” defences.28 These may help to allay concerns of 
a “chilling effect”29 upon the development of ISPs, for example. Secondly, even 
absent the influence of European Directives, and even assuming the 
requirements for prima facie liability as an accessory were met, it may often be 
the case that the intermediary would have a defence to accessory liability 
because the intermediary could not be expected to act as a judge and decide 
whether the rights of the rightholder should trump the fundamental rights 
enjoyed by the primary wrongdoer and other third parties – in particular, that of 
freedom of expression.30 If the intermediary has acted entirely reasonably then it 
would seem harsh to impose accessory liability.31 It therefore seems generally 
appropriate for the intermediary to seek the authority of the court before 
blocking websites, for example.32 (There are exceptions to this approach in the 
most egregious cases – concerning terrorism or child pornography, for 
example33 – but the present focus involves less extreme instances of 
wrongdoing.)  
Nevertheless, considering the remedies available against an intermediary 
to fall within the scope of accessory liability would help to explain why there is 
no liability to pay damages, but injunctive relief is available. The intermediary 
could not reasonably have been expected to prevent another party from 
operating its website without the reassurance of a court order; as a result, the 
intermediary should not bear responsibility to compensate for past losses. On 
                                           
27 “Common design” is now defined very broadly; in Fish & Fish Lord Sumption recognised that ‘the evidence 
of common design may fairly be regarded as thin’ [2015] UKSC 10; [2015] A.C. 1229, [38]; for further 
discussion see G McMeel, ‘Joint and Accessory Liability for Wrongs in Private Law’ [2016] LMCLQ 29; P 
Davies, ‘Accessory Liability in Tort’ (2016) 132 LQR 16. 
28 See eg Articles 12-15 of the E-Commerce Directive (European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
[2000] OJ L178/1, which was transposed into domestic law by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002, SA 2002/2013). 
29 Cf Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 545 US 913 (2005), 960 (Breyer J). 
30 Cf Aldous LJ in Totalise plc v The Motley Fool Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1897; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1233, [22]: “It 
is for the applicant to satisfy the court that the order should be made, not for the defendant to take a view which 
could be wrong”. 
31 On defences generally, see P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, 2015) ch 7 
32 This is consistent with recital (4) of the E-Commerce Directive, which allows Member States to establish 
specific requirements which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior to the removal or disabling of information. See 
too UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH Case C-314/12, [2014] Bus LR 541. 
33 Blocking systems are commonly used by ISPs to implement the blocking regime of the Internet Watch 
Foundation, for example: see Cartier [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [14]. 
the other hand, once the intermediary has knowledge of the infringement, and a 
court has decided that it should be prevented, then the intermediary could be 
liable as an accessory if it took no further action, and injunctive relief should be 
available to prevent such future wrongs. Little turns on whether this injunction 
is granted quia timet. 
Viewing the intermediaries as accessories and therefore wrongdoers 
would provide an orthodox foundation for injunctive relief. It would also 
explain why intermediaries need “safe harbours” as “immunities” for liability. 
After all, if the accessories would not be liable either as primary wrongdoers or 
accessories, it is hard to see why they require any immunities at all. Moreover, 
this view is perhaps consistent with the requirement, in the copyright context, 
that the intermediary must have “actual knowledge” that another person is using 
its service to infringe copyright; such knowledge may be acquired through a 
notice from the rightholder.34  
It is not certain whether the European Directives adopt a similar view 
towards wrongdoing. The European approach may have been influenced by the 
German doctrine of “Störerhaftung”, or “disturber liability’,35 which is said not 
to be based on tortious principles of negligence. Rather, the only remedy is an 
injunction to protect property rights.36 However, an injunction will only be 
granted against “disturbers” if three conditions are satisfied: (i) the defendant 
has made an adequate causal contribution to an infringing act of a third party; 
(ii) it was both legally and factually possible for the defendant to prevent the 
direct infringement; (iii) the defendant violated a reasonable “duty of care” or 
“monitoring duty” to prevent the infringement.37 It would appear that this last 
requirement could suggest that an injunction is based upon wrongful – or at 
least unreasonable – behaviour. It is suggested that considering ISPs to be 
wrongdoers – preferably as accessories – would provide a sound theoretical 
explanation both for the award of an injunction, and also for why ISPs should 
have to bear the costs of that injunction. Nevertheless, the more prevalent view 
appears to be that ISPs are not wrongdoers, and on that basis a different 
explanation for injunctive relief is required. 
                                           
34 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 s97A(2). 
35 For further explanation, see eg A Kur, ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The 
Situation in Germany and the Throughout the EU’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law & The Arts 525. 
36 By analogy with § 1004 of the German Civil Code (BGB). 
37 See further M Leistner, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (2014) 9 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 75; see too C Busch, ‘Secondary Liability for Open Wireless Networks in 
Germany: Balancing Regulation and Innovation in the Digital Economy’ in in G Dinwoodie (ed), Secondary 
Liability of Internet Service Providers (Springer, 2017). 
 Injunctions against non-wrongdoers 
In Cartier, the Court of Appeal was prepared to accept that the ISPs were 
“innocent” and “not guilty of any wrongdoing”.38 This raises the spectre of 
accountability without liability.39 However, it is suggested that even on the basis 
that the ISPs do not commit a wrong, injunctive relief can be readily explained 
by analogy with the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. In Norwich Pharmacal 
Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners,40 the House of Lords held that an 
innocent third party could be compelled to assist the victim of a wrong by 
giving the latter relevant information. Lord Reid said “that if through no fault of 
his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate 
their wrongdoing he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty 
to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and 
disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers”.41 That principle can easily be 
extended to apply to intermediaries.42 In Cartier, Kitchin LJ framed it as a duty 
to take proportionate measures to assist the person wronged when requested to 
do so.43 
This approach helps to explain injunctive relief against intermediaries in a 
manner which is consistent with more general principles of equitable relief. 
However, it is important to note that the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction is 
itself a departure from the more common situation where an injunction is 
granted against an actual wrongdoer.44 Moreover, the language of “duty” may 
perhaps confuse. The intermediary, as an innocent party, does not owe a duty to 
the rightholder such that a breach would give rise to a claim for damages. 
Indeed, even after an injunction has been granted, any perceived “duty” would 
be owed to the court issuing the injunction, rather than to a rightholder. The key 
point is that a person innocently mixed up in wrongdoing can be compelled by 
the court to help to untangle that wrongdoing, and intermediaries might 
therefore fall within the jurisdiction of the court to grant equitable relief. 
                                           
38 Eg [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [54] (Kitchin LJ). See too [166] (Kitchin LJ), [200]-[210] 
(Briggs LJ). 
39 See generally M Husovec, Injunctions Against Intermediaries in the European Union: Accountable But Not 
Liable? (CUP, 2017). 
40 [1974] AC 133. 
41 [1974] AC 133, 175.  
42 The Court of Appeal in Cartier agreed with the first instance judge ([106]) that it was “not a long step” from 
Norwich Pharmacal to granting injunctions against intermediaries: [52]. 
43 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [52]. 
44 “you cannot have an injunction except against a party to the suit”: Iveson v Harris:  32 E.R. 102, 104; (1802) 
7 Ves. Jr. 251, 257 (Lord Eldon LC).  
 Perhaps the major difficulty on the facts of Cartier was that the injunction 
sought was not in support of further substantive proceedings. In Fourie v Le 
Roux,45 the House of Lords held that although the court did have jurisdiction to 
grant a freezing order, the discretion to grant an injunction had not been 
properly exercised: the injunction ought not to have been granted since there 
were no subsisting proceedings to which the freezing order could be ancillary 
and no undertaking to commence such proceedings had been given. The same 
approach has often been taken to Norwich Pharmacal orders: an injunction 
should only be granted against the innocent third party if that would help to 
support primary litigation. An injunction against a party who is not a wrongdoer 
should be in support of substantive relief in ancillary proceedings 
 Steven Gee QC has therefore criticised the decision to grant an injunction 
in Cartier as departing from the guidelines laid down by the House of Lords in 
Fourie v Le Roux.46 Given the breadth of section 37(1), the court in Cartier 
clearly had jurisdiction to grant an injunction in the “strict sense”,47 but Gee has 
argued that it was not a proper exercise of the court’s jurisdiction “in the 
absence of substantive proceedings on the merits in England to which the 
injunction was ancillary and in the absence of justification under s.25(1)” of the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 in support of proceedings abroad 
against infringers.48 There is some force to Gee’s criticisms, especially since the 
injunction in Fourie was discharged by the House of Lords for similar reasons. 
 Nevertheless, it is suggested that the injunction in Cartier was properly 
granted. One reason is that the English legislation should be interpreted 
consistently with Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive49 in accordance with 
the Marleasing50 principle in order to achieve a result which is consistent with 
European law. But that is a narrow explanation, the force of which may reduce 
post-Brexit. It would not help beyond the context of rights which have been 
considered by the European legislators, yet the principles seem to be of more 
general application.51 At first instance, Arnold J considered that the court could 
                                           
45 [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 W.L.R. 320. See too Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v Distos 
Compania Naviera S.A. [1979] A.C. 210. 
46 [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [2015] 1 All E.R. 949para 1-009. Although Gee criticised the decision of Arnold J 
on this point, the criticisms are equally pertinent to the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
47 [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 W.L.R. 320 [16], [25]-[31] (Lord Scott) 
48 S Gee, Commercial Injunctions 6th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 1-009. 
49 Which requires Member States to ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right: see n15 above. 
50 See Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (C-106/89) [1990] E.C.R. I-4135; 
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305 at [8]. 
51 Indeed, similar principles appear to be applied throughout the common law world: see eg Roadshow Films Pty 
Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2016] FCA 1503; Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc. 2017 SCC 34. 
properly grant an injunction even without invoking European influences,52 and 
it is suggested that he was right to do so. In the Court of Appeal greater 
emphasis was placed upon the Marleasing principle,53 but it is suggested that 
that was unnecessary. 
Cartier can be distinguished from cases such as Fourie v Le Roux 
because in Cartier the substantive relief sought was the injunction itself. The 
injunction against the intermediary was more important to the rightholder than 
claims against the primary wrongdoer, since the main concern of the rightholder 
was to prevent access to the infringing websites. This turns Fourie v Le Roux on 
its head: whereas in Fourie v Le Roux the freezing order should be ancillary to 
primary, substantive proceedings, forcing the rightholder in Cartier to bring a 
claim against primary wrongdoers would itself have been ancillary – from the 
rightholder’s perspective – to the main goal of obtaining injunctive relief. This 
might be criticised since it could be perceived as making claims against third 
parties easier to establish than claims against primary tortfeasors who are 
actually committing the wrongs, and this might seem unpalatable as accessory 
liability should not be an easy work-around which effectively allows 
rightholders not to bother with difficult claims against those most culpable. 
There is much force in these criticisms, but the decision in Cartier might 
nevertheless be viewed as a pragmatic solution to a difficult problem. The ISPs 
represent the “choke point” and are perhaps the best cost-avoiders;54 a claim for 
injunctive relief against an intermediary is much more effective in protecting a 
claimant’s rights than a huge number of claims against individual primary 
infringers.  
This pragmatic approach accords with the flexibility of the equitable 
jurisdiction to grant injunctions, which has evolved over time to meet the 
demands of commercial litigation.55 It is, however, unclear whether the 
requirement for a substantive cause of action has been dispensed with entirely, 
                                           
52 [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) [94]-[111]. 
53 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [56]. 
54 In Cartier [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700  [163], Kitchin LJ said: “the economic logic of 
granting injunctions against intermediaries, whether they be website hosts or ISPs, is that it is economically 
more efficient to require intermediaries to take action to prevent infringement occurring using their services than 
it is to require rightholders to take action directly against the infringers.” Similarly the decision of Arnold J 
[2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [2015] 1 All E.R. 949 at [251]. See too Recital (59) of the Information Society 
Directive. 
55 The importance of “a market-based demand for effective pre-emptive relief” in response to continuing 
developments in commercial law generally was accurately noted by Lord Neuberger in his Foreword to S Gee, 
Commercial Injunctions 6th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) xiv. 
or rather limited to internet intermediaries.56 It is suggested that it is generally 
appropriate to require the claimant to initiate substantive proceedings, such that 
Norwich Pharmacal-type orders should only be made in support of those 
proceedings.57 Equity should not act in vain. However, in the context of 
injunctions against intermediaries involved in the infringement of intellectual 
property rights, there is generally no danger of Equity acting in vain,58 since the 
blocking order is the remedy that is truly desired. It might be thought to be 
overly formalistic to require the rightholder to sue one individual in order to 
obtain an injunction against an intermediary, at least where it is not contested 
that there are many wrongdoers; the relief obtained from one individual alone 
would be highly unlikely to satisfy the rightholder, even though a large number 
of such claims may be possible. Following Cartier, it would appear that there is 
no need to bring substantive proceedings against one particular wrongdoer, or 
against “defendants unknown”,59 where the court is satisfied that there are 
inevitably individuals, who infringe intellectual property rights over the 
internet, against whom claims could be brought. This parallels the courts’ 
approach towards accessory liability where individual primary wrongs are not 
established in the context of intellectual property rights; where it is clear that 
primary wrongs have been committed, the court will not demand strict proof of 
any wrong in particular.60  
 The availability of injunctive relief against intermediaries may have 
important consequences beyond ISPs.61 This should be clarified through future 
decisions. In any event, it is suggested that the Court of Appeal was correct in 
agreeing with Arnold J that three key points pointed to the availability of a 
principled basis for the blocking order:62 first, injunctions are not only granted 
against infringers of the right in question; second, an analogy can be drawn with 
the equitable protective duty described in Norwich Pharmacal; third, the court’s 
                                           
56 Interestingly, in UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH Case C-314/12, Advocate 
General Cruz Vilalón thought that the claim against the operators of the illegal website should be pursued as a 
matter of priority (Opinion, para [107]), but this was not followed by the Court of Justice. 
57 This appears to have been accepted post-Cartier in Octagon Overseas Ltd v Coates [2017] EWHC 877 (Ch) 
[17]-[22] (HHJ Karen Walden-Smith). 
58 See eg the fears of Lord Scott in Fourie v Le Roux [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 W.L.R. 320 [37]. 
59 See eg Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11; [2009] 1 
W.L.R. 2780. 
60 See eg Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [2010] ECC 13 [110] 
(Kitchin J). 
61 For example, injunctions may be available against physical intermediaries, such as those who run physical 
marketplaces: Tommy Hilfiger LLC v Delta Center Case C-494/15. 
62 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [55] 
jurisdiction under s37(1) is able to be applied in new ways.63 The court’s 
practice towards granting injunctions is not set in stone, and can continue to 
evolve in a typically incremental manner.64 The blocking orders granted in 
Cartier represent a further stage in the evolution of the equitable jurisdiction to 
grant injunctions, but this may be welcomed as a pragmatic response to the new 
and difficult challenges posed by the infringement of intellectual property rights 
over the internet. 
 
 
Conditions underpinning blocking orders 
 Although courts have jurisdiction to grant blocking orders, that does not 
mean that they should always do so. After all, injunctions are coercive 
remedies, and blocking orders in particular may have severe effects. It is often 
said that injunctions will only be awarded where damages are “inadequate”, but 
that does not really apply to claims against ISPs where damages would not be 
awarded.65 However, the principle that injunctions should only be awarded as a 
last resort may be applied in the context of claims against intermediaries too. 
Indeed, there are remedies available to a rightholder which are less extreme than 
blocking orders: disclosure, notice and takedown, de-indexing, and so on. 
Riordan has argued that “it is regrettable that English courts have not required 
claimants to exhaust the available alternatives before seeking blocking 
injunctions”.66 However, it is suggested that it is understandable why courts 
have refrained from requiring rightholders to try all other possible remedies 
before applying for a blocking injunction. It would be unduly cumbersome, 
time-consuming (when removing infringing websites quickly may be important) 
and expensive for rightholders to apply for a range of remedies which will not 
be as effective or suitable on the facts of the case. Of course, if an alternative 
remedy would provide satisfactory redress that is a very significant factor for 
the court to take into account when deciding whether to grant a blocking 
                                           
63 See eg Apple v Samsung [2012] EWCA Civ 139, [2013] FSR 9, where the court granted a publicity order in 
favour of a non-infringer who had been granted a declaration of non-infringement. See too South Carolina 
Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven Provincien" NV [1987] AC 24, 44 (Lord Goff). 
64 [46], citing Lord Nicholls’ dissenting judgment in Mercedes Benz v Leiduck [1996] AC 284. See too eg [54]; 
South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven Provincien" NV [1987] AC 24, 44 (Lord 
Goff); Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson [2000] QB 775, 785-786 (Lord Woolf MR). For 
further discussion, see recently Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc 
[2017] EWHC 480 (Ch); [2017] E.C.C. 17. 
65 Especially as a result of the “safe harbour” defences: see n 28 above. 
66 J Riordan, ‘Website Blocking Injunctions under United Kingdom and European Law’ in G Dinwoodie (ed), 
Secondary Liability of Internet Service Providers (Springer, 2017) 312. 
injunction, but it is appropriate for the courts to consider whether to grant a 
blocking injunction without other alternatives having been exhausted. In 
Cartier, the court was not persuaded that alternative measure would have been 
equally effective but less burdensome.67 
 The threshold conditions for granting a blocking order have largely been 
laid down by the Enforcement Directive68 and E-Commerce Directive.69 First, 
the ISPs must be intermediaries. Secondly, the users of operators of the target 
website must be infringing the claimant’s intellectual property rights. Thirdly, 
the user or operators of the target websites must use the services of the ISPs. 
Fourthly, the ISPs must have knowledge of this.70 All four criteria were sensibly 
held to be satisfied on the facts of Cartier. 
 Of more interest, perhaps, are the principles to be applied when 
considering whether to grant a blocking injunction. In Cartier the Court of 
Appeal agreed with Arnold J that seven factors must be considered: the relief 
must (i) be necessary; (ii) be effective; (iii) be dissuasive; (iv) not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly; (v) avoid barriers to legitimate trade; (vi) 
be fair and equitable and strike a “fair balance” between the applicable 
fundamental rights71; and (vii) be proportionate. Moreover, the court should 
take into account the substitutability of other websites for the target website, 
and the remedies awarded should be applied in such a way as to provide 
safeguards against abuse.72 
 These factors are all important, and it is likely that a large degree of 
leeway will be given to a trial judge who has heard all the evidence and 
balanced all considerations in a reasonable way. Outcomes of particular 
applications will clearly depend upon an intense focus upon the facts of the 
case.73 In any event, Cartier confirms that it is not necessary for a rightholder to 
prove that a blocking injunction will reduce the overall level of infringement of 
its trade marks, although if there are a large number of other websites which are 
likely to be “equally accessible and appealing to the interested user” then a 
blocking order may not be proportionate.74 The question of proportionality is 
                                           
67 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [174]-[178]. For further explanation, see [2014] EWHC 3354 
(Ch) [197]-[217] (Arnold J). 
68 Articles 3 and 11. 
69 Articles 12-15. 
70[2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [80]. 
71 Protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as intellectual property rights 
(Art 17), the freedom to conduct a business (Art 16), and freedom of expression and information (Art 11). 
72 See further [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [100]-[183]. 
73 See similarly EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [2013] ECDR 8 [100] 
(Arnold J). 
74 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [118]. 
obviously key,75 and this could be greatly influenced by the issue of who should 
bear the costs of the blocking injunction. This difficult issue is set to trouble the 
Supreme Court, and is the focus of the next section.  
 
Costs 
 Given that injunctive relief against intermediaries is increasingly 
entrenched as a potential remedy, it is necessary to determine who should bear 
the costs. This has become a commercially significant issue, and can clearly 
have an impact upon whether it is proportionate to grant an injunction. It is 
important to differentiate between the costs of the application and the costs of 
implementing the injunction. In Cartier, the majority of the Court of Appeal 
held that – on the particular facts of that case – all the costs should be borne by 
the intermediary.76  
 The decision in Cartier would be relatively straightforward to explain if 
liability were based upon the intermediary being a wrongdoer (probably as an 
accessory, but equally on the basis of “Störerhaftung”77). On that premise, it is 
understandable why, between a bad-acting intermediary and an innocent 
rightholder, it is the former who should bear all the (reasonable) costs.78 Indeed, 
it would be unexceptional for an accessory to have to bear the costs of an 
injunction to prevent his or her own wrongdoing. Cartier would become an easy 
case. Yet the Court of Appeal thought that the intermediary was innocent of any 
wrongdoing, and this may well be supported by the Supreme Court. That makes 
Cartier much more difficult: if both the rightholder and the intermediary are 
considered to be innocent parties, it is not intuitively obvious which innocent 
party should have to pay. 
  
Costs of the application 
On the facts of Cartier, the Court of Appeal held that the intermediaries 
should bear the cost of the application following the issue of proceedings. This 
decision was largely motivated by the fact that the intermediaries resisted the 
                                           
75 It might be suggested that, if the ISP is not a wrongdoer, the requirement of proportionality is much easier to 
satisfy if the rightholder has to bear the costs of the injunction, contrary to the decision of the majority in 
Cartier: [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [212] (Briggs LJ). 
76 At least after the issuing of proceedings; Richemont had to bear the costs of the application prior to that point 
(which included the costs associated with gathering the evidence to establish both jurisdiction and the 
appropriateness of the order). 
77 See eg Störerhaftung des Access-Providers case I ZR 174/14 (decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 26 
Nov 2015) translated in [2016] IIC 481, at paras 38-40. 
78 Senior Courts Act 1981 s51 provides that costs are at the discretion of the court. 
application for an injunction.79 The Court of Appeal applied the usual rule in 
England that costs follow the event, and required the unsuccessful 
intermediaries to pay. The majority of the Court of Appeal explicitly rejected an 
analogy with the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction which requires the 
rightholders to bear the cost of the application, noting that injunctive relief was 
the primary aim of the rightholders.80 
 The costs in Cartier are very large.81 But the decision regarding the costs 
of the application rests very much on the particular facts of that case. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the availability of injunctive relief and who should bear 
the costs of implementing any injunction, the intermediaries not unreasonably 
chose to argue the case fully before the court. However, by not simply taking a 
neutral stance as the granting of an injunction, but instead forcefully resisting 
the application,82 the majority was persuaded that the intermediaries had chosen 
to “fight”, and then “lost”, such that the “loser pays” principle was engaged.83 
Moreover, although Briggs LJ dissented regarding the costs of implementing 
the blocking order sought in Cartier, he did not dissent regarding the costs of 
the application. This may be somewhat harsh. After all, the innocent party 
generally only has to pay its own costs (and perhaps sometimes the applicant’s 
costs) when forced to disclose information if it is itself implicated culpably in 
wrongdoing or seeking to obstruct justice.84 The intermediaries in Cartier were 
clearly not seeking to obstruct justice, but instead seeking legal clarity. 
Perhaps the decision should be accepted since it would be unfair for these 
particular claimants to shoulder all the costs in a test case where the 
intermediaries incurred very large costs. To have made the rightholders pay for 
the cost of the application in Cartier would have placed a substantial burden on 
the claimants, which would not be shared by rightholders in subsequent 
actions.85 In the future, intermediaries can be expected to have learned the 
lessons of Cartier, and either present a more neutral view to the court, or simply 
                                           
79 Cartier [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [188]. 
80 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [189]-[194]; see too nn 54-60 above. 
81 At first instance, Arnold J said that the costs already ran to over £620,000: see [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 
1 All ER 700 [188]. 
82 Despite the intermediaries’ protestations to the contrary: Cartier [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 
[188]. 
83 At [188] Kitchin LJ cited the observation of Arnold J at first instance ([6]) that “The proof of the pudding is in 
the eating. The ISPs have served a costs schedule in support of their application, if successful in principle with 
regard to costs, for interim payment, which does not purport to be a comprehensive statement of their costs, but 
nevertheless runs to over £620,000. A neutral party does not spend over £620,000 opposing an application”. 
84 S Gee, Commercial Injunctions 6th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) para 23-049. 
85 By contrast, all the major ISPs appeared in Cartier, and seemed to instruct jointly their legal representatives 
such that it is reasonable to suppose that the costs were shared between these ISPs. Admittedly, these ISPs bear 
the costs to advantage of other intermediaries in the future. 
not appear before the Court at all when a rightholder seeks injunctive relief.86 
On this basis, the righholder would have to bear the costs of the application. Yet 
not contesting applications could have the unfortunate effect that applications 
will generally be made unopposed, and as a result judges may naturally tend to 
grant the injunctions sought.87 It may well be thought preferable to encourage 
balanced argument to be presented before the court,88 even if that were to 
involve intermediaries not vigorously opposing an injunction but instead 
presenting a less partisan but more balanced and neutral view. This would be 
possible if the intermediaries were not liable to pay costs, and could therefore 
take a more relaxed and nuanced view of the matter. Indeed, this would be 
consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Totalise plc v The 
Motley Fool Ltd,89 where Aldous LJ said that, in the context of an application 
for a Norwich Pharmacal order, “in some cases it may be appropriate for the 
party from whom disclosure is sought to appear in court to assist. In such a case 
he should not be prejudiced by being ordered to pay costs”.90 Innocent parties 
should not generally be penalised for asking that the claimant’s arguments be 
tested in court.91 
 
Costs of implementation 
 As regards injunctions awarded following the infringement of copyright, 
in a series of decisions Arnold J established that a reasonable balance was 
struck between the innocent rightholder and innocent intermediary if the 
rightholder paid the costs of the application and the intermediary bore the costs 
of implementing the injunction.92 This approach was supported by the majority 
in Cartier, which insisted that the intermediaries would not be reimbursed by 
                                           
86 As was the case in Cartier II, the follow-up to the first decision in Cartier: [2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), [2016] 
E.C.C. 16 [4] (HHJ Hacon).  
87 For a similar phenomenon in the context of flawed decision-making by trustees, see the string of cases 
following Re Hastings-Bass [1975] Ch 25, which was finally reined in by the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108; for further discussion, see P Davies and G Virgo, ‘Relieving 
Trustee’s Mistakes’ [2013] RLR 73. 
88 See too Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecoms plc [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), [2012] 1 All E.R. 869 [53]. 
89 [2001] EWCA Civ 1897; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1233 [29]. 
90 [2001] EWCA Civ 1897; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1233 [29]. 
91 Unless, perhaps, the answer is obvious in an egregious case, such as terrorism or child pornography. 
92 See eg Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2012] 
Bus LR 1471; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications plc (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 
(Ch), [2012] Bus LR 1525; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 
(Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR 14; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (No 2) [2012] EWHC 
1152 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR 15; EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), 
[2013] ECDR 8; Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 2058 
(Ch), [2013] ECDR 14; Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), [2014] ECDR 7. See too Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 937 (Ch) (Henderson J).  
the rightholders for implementing the blocking order. Kitchin LJ gave six 
reasons for this conclusion. None is compelling. 
 First, his Lordship thought it important to bear in mind that “Article 11 of 
the Enforcement Directive and Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive 
require Member States to ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for 
an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe an intellectual property right”.93 This is of course true, but it does not 
give any indication as to who should bear the costs of the injunction. After all, a 
rightholder would still be in a position to apply for an injunction even if it had 
to bear the costs. 
 Secondly, Kitchin LJ said that the same provisions “must be seen as a 
part of the larger scheme which includes the immunities from infringement 
claims and the exception from monitoring conferred on intermediaries”.94 This 
is perhaps true, but it is not at all clear that the intermediaries would be liable to 
pay damages as a matter of English law anyway.95 More fundamentally, Kitchin 
LJ thought that “the intermediaries make profits from the services which the 
operators of the target websites use to infringe the intellectual property rights of 
the rightholders, and the costs of implementing the order can therefore be 
regarded as a cost of carrying on the business”.96 This was the crucial factor that 
influenced Jackson LJ, who thought that the costs “are part of the price which 
the ISPs must pay for the immunities which they enjoy under the two 
Directives”.97 But this is ultimately an assertion which tends towards 
circularity.98 Indeed, it might equally be suggested that if the rightholder wants 
to protect its rights through injunctive relief, then the rightholder should have to 
pay; this may itself be seen as the cost to the rightholder of doing business, or 
the cost of enforcing one’s rights.99 It is not at all clear that the fact that the 
intermediaries make profits should mean that they have to pay to implement 
injunctions, or that this should be considered to be any sort of quid pro quo for 
the immunities granted (which may not even have been necessary). Making 
profits does not turn the intermediaries into wrongdoers. More generally, a party 
who deliberately acts in order to make profits at another party’s expense does 
                                           
93 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [142]. 
94 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [143]. 
95 See n 28 above. 
96 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [143], approving earlier decisions of Arnold J such as Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications plc (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), [2012] Bus LR 
1525. 
97 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [214]. 
98 Despite the contrary protestations of Kitchin LJ: [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [172]. 
99 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [206] (Briggs LJ). 
not commit any wrong if only lawful means are employed, and is free to 
continue to act in such a manner. Any other party who wishes to stop such 
conduct must persuade the profiting party to do so – often by paying money. 
Cartier may be considered to be a similar case: on the assumption that the 
intermediaries were acting lawfully, the rightholders should have to pay to stop 
the intermediaries from continuing to act in a lawful manner. It may be that the 
Court of Appeal was attracted to economic arguments which revolve around the 
intermediaries being best-able to absorb the costs. These appear to have been 
recognised at a European level,100 but such arguments were not pressed in 
Cartier101 and it may be difficult to reach a clear consensus through careful 
economic analysis of this issue. A more principled approach might be to query 
why an innocent party should have to bear the costs of being compelled to do 
something at all.102 
 Thirdly, Kitchin LJ observed that “recital (23) of the Enforcement 
Directive and recital (59) of the Information Society Directive provide that the 
conditions and procedures relating to applications for injunctions against an 
intermediary should be left to national courts but I think it is implicit in both 
recitals that it would be entirely appropriate for a national court to order that the 
costs of implementation of any such injunction should be borne by the 
intermediary”.103 With respect, it is difficult to find any such implication in the 
recitals. Recital (23) provides that:  
Without prejudice to any other measures, procedures and remedies 
available, rightholders should have the possibility of applying for an 
injunction against an intermediary whose services are being used by a 
third party to infringe the rightholder's industrial property right. The 
conditions and procedures relating to such injunctions should be left to 
the national law of the Member States. As far as infringements of 
copyright and related rights are concerned, a comprehensive level of 
harmonisation is already provided for in Directive 2001/29/EC. Article 
8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC should therefore not be affected by this 
Directive. 
This is entirely neutral on the issue of costs, and clearly leaves the matter to the 
national courts. Similarly, recital (59) provides that: 
                                           
100 See Cartier [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) [251] (Arnold J). See too the recent decision of the French Cour de 
Cassation in SFR v Association of Cinema Producers, 6 July 2017, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2017:C100909. 
101 Cartier [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) [251] (Arnold J). 
102 See, eg, the dissenting judgment of Briggs LJ in Cartier, discussed in the text to nn 115-126 below. 
103 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [144]. 
(59) In the digital environment, in particular, the services of 
intermediaries may increasingly be used by third parties for infringing 
activities. In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such 
infringing activities to an end. Therefore, without prejudice to any other 
sanctions and remedies available, rightholders should have the possibility 
of applying for an injunction against an intermediary who carries a third 
party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in a 
network. This possibility should be available even where the acts carried 
out by the intermediary are exempted under Article 5. The conditions and 
modalities relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law 
of the Member States. 
Again, the conditions of the injunction are left to national courts, and there is 
nothing to suggest that the costs should be borne by the intermediaries. 
 Fourthly, Kitchin LJ thought that decisions of the CJEU in L’Oreal v 
Ebay104 and UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH105 
“contemplated that the intermediary would bear the costs of implementation”.106 
This is true, and is perhaps the strongest reason for the majority’s decision on 
costs.107 Nevertheless, it is not ultimately decisive because the issue of costs has 
not been the subject of European harmonisation, and remains a question for the 
national courts to decide.108 Moreover, the European approach may have been 
influenced by other jurisdictions which consider the intermediary to be liable as 
some sort of wrongdoer.109 Viewing the ISPs to be accessories and therefore 
wrongdoers could provide a compelling basis for the result in Cartier, but 
simply following suggestions of the CJEU might distort the question of costs 
when looked at through an English perspective if the latter considers ISPs to be 
entirely innocent. It should also be remembered that the requirement of 
proportionality does not only take into account the costs of the injunction, but 
also proportionality between the rightholder and affected website owner, for 
instance.110  
                                           
104 Case C-324/09, [2011] ECR I-6011. 
105 Case C-314/12, [2014] Bus LR 541. 
106 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [147]. See too [120], citing Scarlet Extended SA Société Belge 
des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs Scrl (SABAM ) Case C-70/10,  [2011] ECR I-11959 at [48] to much the 
same effect. See too Article 3(1) of the Enforcement Directive which requires that available remedies not be 
“unnecessarily complicated or costly”. 
107 However, it may also be that the Court of Justice was simply reflecting the specific factual presumptions 
underlying the references themselves.  
108 See eg [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [208] (Briggs LJ). 
109 See for example the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in L'Oréal SA v eBay 
International AG [2012] Bus LR 1369, para 139. See too the discussion of Störerhaftung at nn 35-37 above. 
110 Cartier [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) [184] (Arnold J). 
 Fifthly, Kitchin LJ rejected any analogy with the Norwich Pharmacal 
order since “the proceedings were not in any sense preparatory to proceedings 
against the wrongdoers, and there was never any real prospect of Richemont 
recovering the costs of the proceedings from the wrongdoers”.111 As discussed 
above, this is a potential ground of distinction.112 Nevertheless, the fundamental 
issue of whether it is appropriate for an innocent third party who has become 
mixed up in wrongdoing to have to bear the costs is similar in both Cartier and 
Norwich Pharmacal.113 
 Sixthly, Kitchin LJ emphasised that the approach of the court to the 
matter of costs was necessarily flexible. In some circumstances, the rightholder 
may have to pay some or all of the costs of implementation.114 It is not clear 
when this will arise: presumably if the costs are very high when balanced 
against the value of the rights protected, or perhaps even the profits made by the 
intermediary. In any event, this is not really a reason for imposing the costs 
upon the intermediary as a general rule.  
 It is therefore suggested that the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in 
Cartier are far from convincing. The more principled approach that generally 
applies when seeking injunctive relief against a non-wrongdoer is that the 
rightholder would be expected to pay for the costs of complying with the 
equitable order, and hope to recover those costs from the primary wrongdoer. 
Of course, the chances of a rightholder ultimately recovering from a primary 
wrongdoer in the context of infringement of intellectual property rights via the 
internet is small, but the general principle persists: third parties who innocently 
become embroiled in wrongdoing should not have to pay costs. By contrast, a 
rightholder may well be expected to pay to protect and enforce its rights. Briggs 
LJ considered it to be “a natural incident of a business which consists of, or 
includes, the exploitation of such rights, to incur cost in their protection, to the 
extent that it cannot be reimbursed by appropriate orders against 
wrongdoers”.115 
 It is suggested that the dissenting judgment of Briggs LJ on this issue is 
most persuasive, and should be adopted by the Supreme Court as consistent 
with general principles of equity. Briggs LJ demonstrated that equity does not 
require an innocent party to bear the costs of complying with an equitable duty 
                                           
111 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [148]. Cf Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen (No.2) [1981] 
F.S.R. 337 
112 See eg text to nn 54-60 above. 
113 And was convincingly addressed by Briggs LJ: see text to nn 116-122 below. 
114 See too [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) [240] (Arnold J). 
115 [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [2017] 1 All ER 700 [206]. 
to assist the victim of the wrong. The victim must bear the costs of bringing his 
or her claim and seek to recover them from the wrongdoer. Briggs LJ was 
fortified in this conclusion by both the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction, and 
Bankers Trust Co v Shapira.116 In the latter case, an order was made against a 
bank to disclose information about one of its customers, notwithstanding its 
duty of confidentiality, since this would help the claimants seeking to trace and 
recover misappropriated property. The innocent bank needed a court order to 
divulge such information, just as the intermediaries in Cartier needed a court 
order to block another party’s website. Briggs LJ rightly highlighted that “a 
standard condition or ‘modality’ for the grant of an injunction requiring the 
relevant disclosure was that the cost reasonably incurred by the innocent 
respondent should be reimbursed by the applicant. In both the leading cases, this 
is treated as an obvious condition, and the reasons for it are not spelt out in 
detail, beyond the common feature of all such cases, namely that the respondent 
has not, in becoming mixed up in the relevant wrongdoing, incurred any 
personal liability to the applicant”.117 In other words, if the rightholder wants 
equitable relief, it should be prepared to pay for it. The innocent party “is not 
expected to have to put his hand in his own pocket for the purpose of 
performing his duties”.118 Briggs LJ was unconvinced that Cartier could be 
distinguished on the basis that claims against primary wrongdoers were unlikely 
to lead to substantial recovery. After all, this was often the case following a 
Bankers Trust order: it may be impossible to identify a defendant worth suing.  
Moreover, in Totalise plc v The Motley Fool Ltd,119 Aldous LJ said:  
“In a normal case the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs of the 
party making the disclosure including the costs of making the disclosure. 
There may be cases where the circumstances require a different order, but 
we do not believe they include cases where: (a) the party required to 
make the disclosure had a genuine doubt that the person seeking the 
disclosure was entitled to it; (b) the party was under an appropriate legal 
obligation not to reveal the information, or where the legal position was 
not clear, or the party had a reasonable doubt as to the obligations; or (c) 
the party could be subject to proceedings if disclosure was voluntary; or 
(d) the party would or might suffer damage by voluntarily giving the 
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disclosure; or (e) the disclosure would or might infringe a legitimate 
interest of another.” 
Although such comments were made in the different context of an application 
for relief under Norwich Pharmacal, they appear pertinent to a dispute such as 
that in Cartier. The intermediaries might well have argued that all five criteria 
identified by Aldous LJ were at issue. After all, the intermediaries might have 
had a doubt about whether the blocking order was proportionate given opposing 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression (a); the position was not clear 
(b); the blocked websites may have had legitimate grounds of complaint against 
the ISPs if the blocking orders were wrongly implemented (c); the ISPs might 
have suffered serious reputational damage by simply complying to the 
rightholder’s requests without a court order (d); the blocking order clearly 
infringed the interests of the affected websites, although there is perhaps a 
question mark over whether those interests should be characterised as legitimate 
(e). 
However, Briggs LJ held that the cost of designing and installing the 
blocking software should be borne by the intermediaries.120 This is sensible; 
after all, the software should be able to be used in response to a large number of 
applications, and it does not seem reasonable for the first applicant to bear all 
the costs to the advantage of subsequent applicants. That would be 
disproportionate.121 Indeed, there are good reasons for holding that 
intermediaries should be equipped to block infringing websites as part of 
carrying on their business. This perhaps echoes Arnold J’s earlier analysis in 
another context that the intermediaries should bear the cost of regulation like 
any other enterprise.122 However, it is suggested that this explanation should 
only extend to the availability of blocking software. The actual costs of 
implementing a particular order is not part of any regulatory regime; similarly, 
as Briggs LJ pointed out, it has never seriously been suggested that the costs of 
Bankers Trust-type orders should be borne by banks as part of the regulatory 
regime, and banks obviously operate within a heavily regulated environment. 
The fundamental principle remains that innocent third parties should not have to 
dig into their own pockets. Claimants seeking redress need to bear the costs of 
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pursuing their claims, aware of the risk that recovery of substantial sums is 
ultimately never certain. 
 On the facts of the cases that have thus far been brought before the 
English courts, the actual costs of implementing the blocking orders appear to 
have been relatively moderate.123 Perhaps because of this, there have not been 
any appeals from the copyright cases.124 But there is clearly the possibility that 
costs will grow as claims multiply,125 and, as Arnold J observed at first instance 
in Cartier, “the implementation costs are likely to increase, and it is difficult to 
foresee by how much”.126 This danger might make the solution of the majority 
of the Court of Appeal in Cartier seem rather unfair, and force the innocent 
intermediaries to shoulder an increasingly large burden.  
  
Conclusion  
 The court’s jurisdiction to grant blocking injunctions now appears to be 
well-established and should be welcomed. It will be interesting to see whether 
such injunctions are invoked in other contexts such as defamation or breach of 
privacy. A key factor will always be whether such an injunction is 
proportionate, and whether alternative measures may be equally effective and 
less burdensome. 
 The more pressing issue concerns costs. The approach adopted by Arnold 
J and the majority Court of Appeal may represent a pragmatic compromise 
given the current levels of costs and technological development: in general, the 
rightholder bears the costs of the application, whilst the intermediary bears the 
costs of implementation. Both parties thereby share the burden.127 Yet it is 
accepted that this stance needs to be “kept under review”128 as applications 
multiply, and the balance struck may look rather unfair in the future. 
The decision in Cartier does appear to be consistent with the view of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.129 Indeed, in McFadden v Sony Music 
Entertainment Germany GmbH, the Court of Justice held that the safe harbour 
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defences did not prevent intermediaries having to pay money as costs.130 In so 
doing, the Court departed from the Opinion of Advocate-General Szpunar.131  
However, the Court of Justice also emphasised that costs was a matter for the 
national court,132 and as a result the approach adopted in other jurisdictions is 
not conclusive in England and Wales. A fragmented approach across Europe 
may be regretted, but it is important that the Supreme Court decides according 
to general principles of domestic law. It is suggested that the outcome in Cartier 
can best be supported by considering the ISPs to be accessories and therefore 
wrongdoers. But if the suggestion that the ISPs are not wrongdoers is 
maintained, then the dissenting judgment of Briggs LJ appears to be more 
convincing: an innocent party should not have to bear the costs of helping 
another party to enforce its rights. Moreover, this approach should apply equally 
in all areas of law, regardless of the nature of the right infringed.133 
The fundamental point of principle is sufficiently important that the 
tenacious pursuit of clarity from the intermediaries in the Cartier case all the 
way up to the Supreme Court is welcome. Final and certain guidance is 
required.  
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